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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can provide enhanced security, as
compared to traditional QKD, and it constitutes an important framework for a quantum network with an un-
trusted network server. Still, a key assumption in MDI-QKD is that the sources are trusted. We propose here
a MDI quantum network with a single untrusted source. We have derived a complete proof of the uncondi-
tional security of MDI-QKD with an untrusted source. Using simulations, we have considered various real-life
imperfections in its implementation, and the simulation results show that MDI-QKD with an untrusted source
provides a key generation rate that is close to the rate of initial MDI-QKD in the asymptotic setting. Our work
proves the feasibility of the realization of a quantum network. The network users need only low-cost modula-
tion devices, and they can share both an expensive detector and a complicated laser provided by an untrusted
network server.
I. INTRODUCTION
The global quantum network is believed to be the next-
generation information-processing platform for speedup com-
putation and a secure means of communication. Among the
applications of the quantum network, quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) is one of the first technology in quantum infor-
mation science to produce practical applications [1–3]. Com-
mercial QKD systems have appeared on the market [4, 5], and
QKD networks have been developed [6–8]. Unfortunately,
due to real-life imperfections, a crucial problem in current
QKD implementations is the discrepancy between its theory
and practice [3]. An eavesdropper (Eve) could exploit such
imperfections and hack a QKD system. Indeed, the recent
demonstrations of various attacks [9–16] on practical QKD
systems highlight that the theory-practice discrepancy is a ma-
jor problem for practical QKD.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion (MDI-QKD) [17] removes all detector side-channel at-
tacks. This kind of attack is arguably the most important se-
curity loophole in conventional QKD implementations [12–
16]. The assumption in MDI-QKD is that the state prepa-
ration can be trusted. Unlike security patches [18–20] and
device-independent QKD [21], MDI-QKD can remove all de-
tector loopholes and is also practical for current technology.
Hence, MDI-QKD has attracted a lot of scientific attention
in both theoretical [22–29] and experimental [30–35] studies.
See [36] for a review of its recent development.
An important feature of MDI-QKD is that it can be used
to build a fiber-based MDI quantum network with a fully un-
trusted network server (see Fig. 1(a)). This framework can re-
alize various quantum information-processing protocols, such
as quantum repeater [37], quantum fingerprinting [38, 39],
blind quantum computing [40], and multiparty quantum com-
munication [29]. This scheme is advantageous in compar-
ison to the recent demonstrations of quantum access net-
works [6–8], since it completely removes the need for the
trust of the central relay node. Nevertheless, the scheme faces
several crucial challenges in practice: (i) A key assumption
is that the users’ frequency-locked lasers are trusted. How-
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) A fiber-based quantum network with N
trusted lasers. (b) A quantum network with a single untrusted laser
source.
ever, since frequency-locked lasers1 used in MDI-QKD ex-
periments [30, 33, 35] are complicated apparatuses, there is a
great risk involved in each user’s trust that a commercial com-
pact laser does not have any security loopholes. (ii) It is well
known that the major challenge in implementation of Fig. 1(a)
is the performance of high-fidelity interference between pho-
tons from spatially separated lasers [17, 30]. (iii) In fiber
communication, it is necessary to introduce additional time-
synchronization system and to include complex feedback con-
trols to compensate for the polarization rotations (e.g., an im-
plementation in [34]). All these challenges render Fig. 1(a)
difficult for practical implementations and applications.
Recently, to mitigate the experimental complexity of the in-
terference from two remote lasers, several groups have pro-
posed a new protocol against untrusted detectors [41–44]. A
1 See, for instance, http://dev.wavelengthreferences.com/clarity-precision-
frequency-standard.
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2slight drawback is that a rigorous security analysis for this
protocol is challenging, which makes the protocol vulnera-
ble to attacks if certain assumptions cannot be satisfied [45].
Another elegant proposal to resolve the limitations in the im-
plementation of MDI-QKD is the so-called plug&play MDI-
QKD [46]. Despite the importance of this proposal, a cru-
cial part to guarantee the security – source monitoring – is ig-
nored, which makes plug&play MDI-QKD vulnerable to vari-
ous source attacks [9–11]. Also, a complete security proof for
plug&play MDI-QKD and the analysis of practical imperfec-
tions are missing.
In this paper, we overcome the challenges of Fig. 1(a) by
proposing a MDI quantum network with a single untrusted
source in Fig. 1(b). The untrusted server transmits strong
laser pulses to users, all of whom monitor the pulses, encode
their bit information and send the attenuated pulses back to
the server for measurement. We focus on the application of
such a network to QKD. Crucially, we show that, even with
an untrusted source, the communication security can be ana-
lyzed quantitatively and rigorously. Motivated by the security
analysis for conventional plug&play QKD [47, 48], we show
what measures by the users are necessary to ensure the se-
curity, and to rigorously derive a lower bound of the secure
key generation rate. Moreover, we propose a novel decoy
state method for MDI-QKD with an untrusted source. Fur-
thermore, using simulations, we study how different real-life
imperfections affect the security, and our simulation results
show that MDI-QKD with an untrusted source provides a key
generation rate that is close to the rate with trusted sources
in the asymptotic limit. These results provide a complete se-
curity analysis for plug&play MDI-QKD, and more impor-
tantly, make plug&play MDI-QKD unconditionally secure,
even with practical imperfections.
Our proposed MDI quantum network has the following
advantages: (i) It completely removes the trust of the laser
source. (ii) It can realize the MDI quantum network with a
single laser, which enables a high-fidelity interference among
photons from different users. (iii) Due to the bi-directional
structure, the system can automatically compensate for any
birefringence effects and polarization-dependent losses in op-
tical fibers, a feature that makes the system highly stable. (iv)
The users can utilize the strong pulses from the server to easily
synchronize and share time references. (v) There is a prospect
of leveraging costly infrastructure for the quantum network,
since the single laser source can be broadband, dynamically
reconfigured and shared by several users via wavelength divi-
sion multiplexing (WDM) [49].
The additional assumption, as compared to the initial MDI
quantum network, is the trust of the monitoring devices. Note
that the users need to monitor only classical laser pulses in-
stead of single-photon signals. Such monitoring can be easily
realized by a standard optical filter and a classical intensity
detector, and it is a necessary part of both BB84 and the ini-
tial MDI-QKD in order to prevent the so-called Trojan-horse
attack [9]. It is important that proof-of-concept experiments
have been reported towards implementation of this monitor-
ing [50–52] and that ID Quantique’s commercial system (i.e.,
Clavis2) has already included a preliminary version of the
monitor [4]. Recently, the security of the intensity detector
has been studied comprehensively in [52]. Our work may lead
to future research on an efficient implementation of the single-
mode filtering and monitoring. This monitoring is also a key
ingredient in other quantum communication protocols such as
quantum illumination [53].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We intro-
duce the protocol of MDI-QKD with an untrusted source in
Sec. II. In Sec. III, we present the security analysis of our pro-
tocol by introducing an equivalently virtual model. In Sec. IV,
we show the simulation results about the key rate comparison
between MDI-QKD with an untrusted source and MDI-QKD
with trusted sources, and study how device imperfections af-
fect the protocol. Finally, we conclude this paper in Sec. V.
II. MDI-QKD WITH AN UNTRUSTED SOURCE
To illustrate our proposal, in Fig. 2, we present a specific
design for QKD with two users. With simple modifications,
our scheme can be applied to multiple users [29]. We consider
a time-bin encoding [30], and the protocol runs as follows.
a. Preliminaries Alice and Bob use a pre-shared key for au-
thentication, and they negotiate parameters needed dur-
ing the protocol run. Alice and Bob perform a calibra-
tion measurement of their devices.
b. Preparation and distribution Charlie generates a strong
laser pulse, which creates two time-bin pulses (early
pulse and late pulse) after an interferometer. Charlie
uses a beam splitter (BS) to split the two time-bin pulses
into two parts and send them to Alice and Bob via two
quantum channels (e.g., optical fibers).
c. Monitoring and Encoding phase Once the pulses arrive
at Alice (Bob), they pass through an optical filter, a
monitoring unit, which consists of a BS and an inten-
sity detector (ID). The pulses are phase-randomized by
a phase modulator, PM1 (PM3), and then encoded by
an Encoder that consists of an intensity modulator (IM)
and a PM. Alice and Bob also use the IM to generate
signal/decoy states. Finally, the pulses are reflected by
a Faraday mirror (FM) and attenuated by a variable op-
tical attenuator (VOA) to single-photon level.
c. Measurement phase The time-bin-encoded weak coher-
ent pulses from Alice and Bob travel back through the
two channels, interfere at the BS of Charlie and finally
they are detected by two single photon detectors. A
coincident event projects the photons into the so-called
singlet state |ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/√2 [30].
d. Basis and signal/decoy reconciliation Alice and Bob an-
nounce their encoding bases and signal/decoy inten-
sity levels over the authenticated public channel and
keep the samples measured in the same bases for sig-
nal/decoy states.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Schematic diagram of a time-bin-encoding MDI-QKD with an untrusted laser source. The strong time-bin laser pulses
are generated by a pulsed laser and an interferometer in Charlie and they are split into two groups by a beam splitter (BS). Once these pulses
arrived at Alice (Bob), they pass through an optical filter (F), a monitoring unit with a BS and a classical intensity detector (ID), a phase
modulator (PM1 and PM3) for phase randomization and a variable optical attenuator (VOA). Then, the pulses are encoded by an Encoder that
consists of an intensity modulator (IM) and a PM, and they are reflected by a Faraday mirror (FM). Finally, the pulses from Alice and Bob
interfere at Charlie’s BS and detected by two single photon detectors (D0 and D1). The coincident counts are recorded by a time interval
analyzer (TIA).
e. Parameter estimation Alice and Bob perform the secu-
rity analysis and the decoy state analysis based on their
monitoring results and Charlie’s public announcements.
g. Error reconciliation and privacy amplification Alice
and Bob perform the error correction. To ensure
that they share a pair of identical keys, they perform
an error-verification step using two-universal hash
functions. Finally, Alice and Bob apply the privacy
amplification to produce the final secret key.
Since the source is entirely unknown and untrusted, we use
three measures to enhance the security of our protocol [9, 47].
1. We place a narrow bandpass filter (together with a sin-
gle mode fiber), i.e., F in Fig. 2, to allow only a single
mode in spectral and spatial domains to enter into the
Encoder. Note that a wavelength-bandpass filter has al-
ready been implemented in commercial QKD systems
(i.e., Clavis2) [4]. Moreover, the analysis in [54] shows
that with standard optical devices, the single mode as-
sumption can be guaranteed with a high rate of accu-
racy.
2. We monitor the pulse energy and the arrival time to ac-
quire certain information about the photon number dis-
tribution (PND) and the timing mode. Such monitor-
ing can also defend the Trojan house attack [9] and it
has been included in commercial QKD systems [4]. By
randomly sampling the pulses to test the photon num-
bers, we can estimate some bounds on the output PND.
In Fig. 2, this estimation is accomplished by Alice’s and
Bob’s BS and ID. In practice, besides the ID, a spectrum
analyzer can also be introduced to monitor the spectral
information.
3. Alice and Bob use PM1 and PM3 to apply the active
phase randomization [50]. The phase randomization is
a general assumption made in most security proofs for
laser-based QKD [55–57] and the randomization can
disentangle the input pulse into a classical mixture of
Fock states.
All the above three measures lead us to analyze the secu-
rity of MDI-QKD with an untrusted source quantitatively and
rigorously.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. System model
To analyze the security of Fig. 2, we model Alice’s (Bob’s)
system in Fig. 3(a). We model all the losses as a λ/(1 − λ)
beam splitter, i.e., the internal transmittance of Alice’s (Bob’s)
local lab is λa (λb), which can be set accurately via VOA in
Fig. 2. Each input pulse after the filter (F) is split into two
via a BS: One (defined as the encoding pulse) is sent to the
Encoder for encoding, and the other (defined as the sampling
pulse) is sent to the ID for sampling. One might suppose that
the PND of the encoding pulse could be easily estimated from
the measurement result of the corresponding sampling pulse
by using the random sampling theorem [58, 59]. However,
this supposition is not true. Any input pulse, after the phase
randomization, is in a Fock state. Therefore, in the case of
a pair of encoding and sampling pulses originating from the
same input pulse, the PNDs of the two pulses are correlated.
4This restriction suggests that the random sampling theorem
cannot be directly applied.
We resolve the above restriction and analyze the security by
introducing a virtual model in Fig. 3(b) [48]. For the imper-
fect ID in Fig. 3(a), assuming that its efficiency is ηID ≤ 1, we
model the q/(1− q) BS and the imperfect ID as a q′/(1− q′)
BS and a perfect ID with q′ = (1 − q)ηID. To ensure that
an identical attenuation is applied to the encoding pulses in
both models, we redefine the internal transmittance in the vir-
tual model as: λ′ = qλ/q′ ≤ 1. Moreover, in the virtual
model, we introduce a 50:50 optical switch to realize the ac-
tive sampling. The optical switch, which is different from a
BS, is solely a sampling device, without any restriction on the
correlation of the PNDs of the encoding pulses and the sam-
pling pulses. The random sampling theorem can be applied.
A crucial fact is that the internal losses in the actual model and
the virtual model are identical. The upper and lower bounds
of output PND estimated from the virtual model are therefore
also valid for those of the actual model, i.e., these two models
are equivalent in the security analysis, an equivalence that has
been proved in [48].
In Fig. 3(b), we definema (na) as the photon number of the
pulses that input (output) Alice. We also define the pulses that
input Alice as
• Untagged pulses: ma ∈ [(1− δa)Ma, (1 + δa)Ma];
• Tagged pulses: ma < (1−δa)Ma orma > (1+δa)Ma.
Here δa is a small positive real number, and Ma is a large
positive integer (which can be the average of the input photon
numbers of the pulses received by Alice). The same defini-
tions apply to Bob’s pulses with parameters {mb, nb, δb,Mb}.
Note that {δa, δb,Ma,Mb} are chosen by Alice and Bob.
From the random sampling theorem, we draw the follow
proposition [47].
Proposition 1. Consider that 2k pulses are sent to Alice
from an untrusted source, and, of these pulse, Va pulses are
untagged. Alice randomly assigns each pulse a status as ei-
ther a sampling pulse or an encoding pulse with equal proba-
bilities. In total, V sa sampling pulses and V
e
a encoding pulses
are untagged. The probability that V ea ≤ V sa − 2ak satisfies
P (V ea ≤ V sa − 2ak) ≤ exp(−k2a), (1)
where a is a small positive real number chosen by Alice (i.e.
the error probability due to statistical fluctuations). That is,
Alice can conclude that V ea > V
s
a − ak with confidence level
τa > 1− exp(−k2a).
The proof is shown in Appendix A. This proposition shows
that Alice can estimate V ea from V
s
a . Bob’s untagged pulses
have the same property. Furthermore, if we define ∆a (∆b)
as the average probability that a sampling pulse belongs to
a tagged sampling pulse in the asymptotic case, then Alice
(Bob) can conclude that there are no fewer than (1−∆a−a)k
((1−∆b− b)k) untagged encoding pulses with high fidelity.
B. Untagged pulses
In our analysis, Alice and Bob focus only on the untagged
pulses for key generation and discard the other pulses. In
practice, since Alice and Bob cannot perform quantum non-
demolishing (QND) measurement on the photon number of
the input pulses with current technology, they do not know
which pulses are tagged and which are untagged. Conse-
quently, the gain and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of
the untagged pulses can not be measured directly. Alice and
Bob can measure only the overall gain and the QBER. How-
ever, from Proposition 1, they know the probability that a cer-
tain pulse is tagged or untagged. Hence, they can estimate the
upper and lower bounds of the gain and the QBER of the un-
tagged pulses. Furthermore, in the case that an untagged pulse
inputs Alice or Bob in Fig. 3(a), then the conditional probabil-
ity that na (nb) photons are emitted by Alice obeys a binomial
distribution, which can be controlled by Alice’s (Bob’s) inter-
nal transmittance. Alice (Bob) can also estimate the bounds
of such a binomial distribution. The specific bounds for the
gain, QBER and the PND of the untagged pulses are shown in
Appendix B. Using these bounds, we can prove the security
of MDI-QKD with an untrusted source quantitatively.
C. Key rate
The secure key rate of MDI-QKD with an untrusted source
in the asymptotic limit of infinite long keys is given by
R ≥ (1−∆a − a)(1−∆b − b)QZ11[1−H2(eX11)]
−QZe,µµfe(EZe,µµ)H2(EZe,µµ),
(2)
where QZ11 and eX11 are, respectively, the lower bound of the
gain in the rectilinear (Z) basis and the upper bound of the er-
ror rate in the diagonal (X) basis, given that both Alice and
Bob send single-photon states in untagged pulses; H2 is the
binary entropy function given by H2(x)=−x log2(x) − (1 −
x) log2(1−x);QZe,µµ andEZe,µµ denote, respectively, the over-
all gain and QBER in the Z basis when Alice and Bob use sig-
nal states; fe ≥ 1 is the error correction inefficiency function
(in simulations, we consider fe = 1.16). Here we use the Z
basis for key generation and the X basis for testing only. In
practice, QZe,µµ and E
Z
e,µµ are directly measured in the exper-
iment, while QZ11 and eX11 are estimated from the decoy states.
D. Decoy states
In the previous decoy-state protocols for MDI-QKD [22,
24–26, 28], the key assumption is that the yield, Ynanb
2, re-
mains the same for signal or decoy states. However, this as-
2 Ynanb is defined as the conditional probability that Charlie has a coinci-
dent event given that Alice (Bob) sends out an na (nb) photon signal.
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sumption is no longer valid in the case that the source is con-
trolled by Eve, because Eve knows both the input photon num-
ber ma (mb) and the output photon number na (nb). In this
case, the parameter that is the same for any signal and decoy
state is Ymambnanb
3. Similarly, the conditional QBERs are
also different if Eve controls the source.
Therefore, in MDI-QKD with an untrusted source, Eve is
given significantly greater power, since she can control both
the input and the output of Alice’s and Bob’s lab. The decoy
state analysis is more challenging. However, rather surpris-
ingly, it is still possible to achieve the unconditional security
quantitatively, even if the source is given to Eve [47]. This
is so mainly because we are focusing only on the untagged
pulses, whose PND, gain and QBER can be bounded. There-
fore, we are still able to estimateQZ11 and eX11. Such an estima-
tion can be completed by using either the numerical method
based on linear programming or the analytical method. The
details of this estimation are shown in Appendix C.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
3 Ymambnanb is defined as the conditional probability that Charlie has a
coincident event given that the two pulses enter Alice’s and Bob’s lab with
photon number ma and mb, and they emitted from Alice’s and Bob’s lab
with photon number na and nb.
ηd Y0 ed f α
20% 3× 10−6 0.1% 75 MHz 0.21 dB/km
ηID σID q  k
0.7 6.55× 104 0.01 10−10 3.5× 1013
TABLE I: List of practical parameters for simulation. The detection
efficiency ηd and the dark count rate Y0 are from commercial ID-220
single photon detectors [4]. The channel misalignment error ed, the
system repetition rate f , the total number of pulses k and the fiber
loss coefficient α are from the 200 km MDI-QKD experiment [34].
The efficiency of the intensity detector (ID) ηID , the noise of the ID
σID , and the beam splitter ratio q are from [48].  is the security
bound considered in our finite-key analysis.
The details of the simulation techniques, including the
model for the imperfect intensity detector, the tagged ratio ∆
and the finite-data statistics, are shown in the Appendix D. We
use the experimental parameters, listed in Table I for simula-
tion. For δ = δa = δb, a choice for it that is too large or too
small will make the security analysis less optimal [48]. We
find numerically that δ = 0.01 is a near an optimal value. In
addition, we assume that the source in Charlie is Poissonian
centered atMc photons per optical pulse. In this bi-directional
structure, Alice’s and Bob’s average input photon numbers
(Ma and Mb) depend on the channel loss and Mc. The gain
and the QBER are derived using the channel model presented
in [25].
The simulation results with an infinite number of signals
are shown by the red curves in Fig. 4. We consider two decoy
states: we fix the vacuum state at ω = 0, the weak decoy state
at ν = 0.01, and optimize the signal state µ for different dis-
tances. With Mc = 107 (Charlie’s mean photon number per
pulse), the case with an untrusted source (red dotted curve) is
similar to that with trusted sources (red dashed curve) at short
distances. The condition changes at long distances. This oc-
curs because at long distances, due to the channel loss, the
photon numbers arrived at by Alice and Bob will be much
smaller than Mc. The lower input photon number increases ∆
and the estimate of the gain of the untagged pulses is sensitive
to the value of ∆ (see Eq. (B1)). This is so especially when
the measured overall gain is small over long distances. In con-
trast, over short distances, the gain is significantly greater than
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Simulation results. Red curves are for an infi-
nite number of signals. Mc denotes the mean of the photon number
(per pulse) of Charlie’s laser pulses. With Mc = 109 and practi-
cal imperfections, MDI-QKD with an untrsuted source can tolerate
about 195 km distance. At the distances below 180 km, the key rates
for the two cases (with trusted and untrusted source) are almost over-
lapping. Blue curves are for a finite number of signals. Finite data
size reduces the efficiencies for both cases. MDI-QKD with an un-
trusted source can still tolerate over 70 km fiber with detectors of
20% efficiency.
∆; therefore, the key rates for the two cases are almost over-
lapping.
A natural scheme for the improvement of the performance
of MDI-QKD with an untrusted source is the use of a brighter
laser. Indeed, the performance is improved substantially by
setting Mc = 109 (red solid curve). The two cases (with
trusted sources and with an untrusted source) have similar re-
sults. Note that sub-nanosecond pulses with ∼ 109 photons
per pulse can be easily generated with directly modulated laser
diodes. For instance, if the wavelength is 1550 nm and the
pulse repetition rate is 75 MHz, the average laser power of
Charlie’s source is ∼ 9.6 mW. This laser power can be pro-
vided by many commercial pulsed laser diodes.
The simulation results with a finite number of signals are
shown by the blue curves in Fig. 4. We choose the confi-
dence level τ for the statistical fluctuations of the estimation
of the number of untagged pulses (see Eq. (1)) as τa = τb =
τ ≥ 1 − 10−7, which suggests that a = b = 3.03 × 10−7.
We set Mc = 109. We can see that finite data size clearly
reduces the efficiencies: first, the statistical fluctuation for
decoy-state MDI-QKD becomes important, and this factor re-
duces the performance of both the trusted source and the un-
trusted source. Second, a and b are non-zero in this finite
data case, and thus the estimate of the gain of the untagged
pulses becomes not tight (see Appendix D)4. In the finite data
setting, our protocol can tolerate about 70 km fiber with stan-
4 That is, due to statistical fluctuations, the proportion of tagged pulses is
increased. Our analysis is conservative in that Eve can fully control the
tagged pulses, which makes the security bound worse than MDI-QKD with
trusted sources.
dard commercial detectors of 20% efficiency. With state-of-
the-art detectors [60], however, the protocol can easily gener-
ate keys over 200 km fiber.
V. DISCUSSION
In summary, we propose a MDI quantum network with an
untrusted source. In this network, the complicated and expen-
sive detectors, together with the laser source, can be provided
by an untrusted network server that can be shared by all users;
that is, a star-type MDI quantum access network can be read-
ily realized on the basis of our proposal for several quantum
information processing protocols [36–40]. Our work proves
the feasibility of such a realization. Moreover, we present a
complete security analysis for MDI-QKD with an untrusted
source. Our analysis and simulation consider various practi-
cal imperfections, including additional loss introduced by the
bi-directional structure, the inefficiency and noise of the inten-
sity monitor, and the finite data-size effect. Furthermore, our
protocol is practically secure and ready for implementation.
An experimental demonstration is in progress.
It is worthy to mention that one practical issue associated
with Fig. 2 is the temporal matching. For instance, the two
channels – Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie – may be differ-
ent in practice, then the arrival times are mismatch when the
pulses return back to Charlie. One solution, as demonstrated
already in [30], is to introduce addition fibers inside either Al-
ice or Bob to match the channel length. Note that, similar to
the conventional plug&play system [4], in our proposal, each
of Alice and Bob should hold certain length of fiber spool as
the optical buffer. Consequently, Alice/Bob can control the
length of this fiber buffer to match the channel difference.
Furthermore, the feedback control techniques, demonstrated
in [34] could also be used to ameliorate temporal-matching
issues.
There are still several imperfections that are not analyzed
in our paper, such as the source flaws in the state prepara-
tion [54], the non-ideality in the optical filter, and the im-
perfections in the electronics of the classical intensity detec-
tor [52]. These questions lead to an interesting future project,
that is, deriving a refined analysis that includes all possible
(small) imperfections and side channels in users. For instance,
Ref. [61] has reported comprehensive analysis against the Tro-
jan horse attack. We expect that this research direction will
move an important step towards unconditionally secure com-
munication networks that are also practical.
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7Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We follow [48] to prove Proposition 1. Among all the V
untagged pulses, each pulse has probability 1/2 to be assigned
as an untagged encoding pulse. Therefore, the probability that
V ea = v obeys a binomial distribution. Cumulative probability
is given by [59]
P (V ea ≤
V − 2k
2
|V = v) ≤ exp(−4
2k2
v
)
For any v ∈ [0, 2k], 2k/v ≥ 1. Therefore, we have
P (V ea ≤
V − 2k
2
|V ∈ [0, 2k]) ≤ exp(−k2).
Since V ∈ [0, 2k] is always true, the above inequality re-
duces to
P (V ea ≤
V − 2k
2
) ≤ exp(−k2). (A1)
By definition, we have
V = V ea + V
s
a . (A2)
Substituting Equation (A2) into Equation (A1), we have
P (V ea ≤ V sa − k) ≤ exp(−k2). (A3)
The above proof can be easily generalized to the case where
for each pulse sent from the untrusted source to Alice/Bob,
Alice/Bob randomly assigns it as either an encoding pulse
with probability β, or a sampling pulse with probability 1−β.
Here β ∈ (0, 1) is chosen by Alice/Bob. It is then straightfor-
ward to show that
P [V ea ≤
β
1− β (V
s
a − 2k)] ≤ exp(−4k2β2). (A4)
Appendix B: Properties of untagged pulses
The main concept to analyze the properties of the untagged
pulses follows the analysis for plug&play QKD presented
in [47]. Both Alice and Bob will focus on the (1−∆a− a)k
and (1 − ∆b − b)k untagged pulses for key generation and
discard the other pulses. This provides a conservative way
to analyze the security, and also, owing to the input photon
numbers of the untagged pulses concentrated within a narrow
range, this makes it much easier to analyze the security.
In practice, since Alice and Bob cannot perform quantum
non-demolishing measurement on the photon number of the
input pulses with current technology, they do not know which
pulses are tagged and which are untagged. As a result, the
gain Q and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) E of the un-
tagged pules cannot be measured experimentally. Here Q is
defined as the conditional probability that Charlie has a co-
incident event given that both Alice and Bob send out an un-
tagged pulse and Alice and Bob use the same basis; E is de-
fined as error rates inside Q.
In experiment, Alice and Bob can measure the overall gain
Qe and the overall QBER Ee. The subscript e denotes the
experimentally measurable overall properties. Moreover, they
know the probability that certain pulse to be tagged or un-
tagged from the above analysis. Although they cannot mea-
sure the gain Q and the QBER E of the untagged pulses di-
rectly, they can estimate the upper bounds and lower bounds
of them. The upper bound and lower bound of Q are:
Q ≤ Q = Qe
(1−∆a − a)(1−∆b − b) ,
Q ≥ Q = max(0, Qe − 1 + (1−∆a − a)(1−∆b − b)
(1−∆a − a)(1−∆b − b) ).
(B1)
The upper bound and lower bound of E · Q can be estimated
as
E ·Q = QeEe
(1−∆a − a)(1−∆b − b) ,
E ·Q = max(0, QeEe − 1 + (1−∆a − a)(1−∆b − b)
(1−∆a − a)(1−∆b − b) ).
(B2)
Moreover, suppose that an untagged pulse with input pho-
ton number ma ∈ [(1 − δa)Ma, (1 + δa)Ma] inputs Fig.3(a)
of main-text, the conditional probability that na photons are
emitted by Alice given that ma photons enter Alice obeys bi-
nomial distribution as:
P (na|ma) =
(
ma
na
)
(λaq)
na(1− λaq)ma−na (0 ≤ λa ≤ 1)
(B3)
For Alice’s untagged bits, we can show that the upper
bound and lower bound of P (na|ma) are:
P (na|ma) =

(1− λaq)(1−δa)Ma , if na = 0;(
(1+δa)Ma
na
)
(λaq)
na(1− λaq)(1+δa)Ma−na , if 1 ≤ n ≤ (1 + δa)Ma;
0, if na > (1 + δa)Ma;
P (na|ma) =

(1− λaq)(1+δa)Ma , if na = 0;(
(1−δa)Ma
na
)
(λaq)
na(1− λaq)(1−δa)Ma−na , if 1 ≤ n ≤ (1− δa)Ma;
0, if na > (1− δa)Ma;
(B4)
8under the condition: (1 + δa)Maλaq < 1. This condition
suggests that the expected output photon number of any un-
tagged pulse should be lower than 1. This is normally a basic
condition in decoy-state BB84 and MDI-QKD based on weak
coherent pulses. For example, for Ma = 107 and q = 0.01,
Alice can simply set λa = 10−6 so that the expected output
photon number is 0.1.
Appendix C: Decoy state analysis
Various decoy-state methods have been proposed for MDI-
QKD [22, 24, 28]. Among all these decoy state protocols,
the two decoy state protocol has been shown to be the op-
timal one [28], it has already been used in all experimental
MDI-QKD implementations reported so far [30–35]. In this
protocol, there are three states: Alice’s signal state µa (for
which the internal transmittance is λµa ), Alice’s two weak de-
coy states νa and ωa (for which the internal transmittance is
λωa < λ
ν
a < λ
µ
a ). In this work, we focus on the symmetric
case where the two channel transmissions from Alice to Char-
lie and from Bob to Charlie are equal. In symmetric case, the
optimal intensities for Alice and Bob are equal [28]. Hence,
to simplify our discussion, we assume that equal intensities
are used by Alice and Bob, i.e., γa=γb=γ with γ ∈ {µ, ν, ω}.
Also, we consider that only the signal state is used to generate
the final key, while the decoy states are solely used to test the
channel properties.
In previous decoy-state protocols for MDI-QKD [22, 24,
28], the key assumption is that the yield of na and nb photon
state Ynanb remains the same, whatever signal states or decoy
states are chosen by Alice and Bob, e.g. Y µµnanb = Y
νν
nanb
. Here
Y µµnanb is defined as the conditional probability that Charlie has
a coincident event given that Alice (Bob) sends out an na (nb)
photon signal and they both chose signal state by setting inter-
nal transmittances λµa and λ
µ
b . This is true because in previous
analysis, Eve knows only the output photon numbers na and
nb of each pulse. However, this assumption is no longer valid
in the case that the source is controlled by Eve. Because Eve
knows both the input photon number ma (mb) and the output
photon number na (nb) when she controls the source. There-
fore she can perform an attack that depends on the values of
both m and n. In this case, the parameter that is the same
for any signal and decoy states is Ymambnanb , the conditional
probability that Charlie has a coincident event given that the
two pulses enter Alice’s and Bob’s lab with photon number
ma and mb, and they emitted from Alice’s and Bob’s lab with
photon number na and nb. Similarly, the conditional QBERs
are also different: eµµnanb 6= eννnanb if Eve controls the source.
The parameter that is the same for the signal state and the de-
coy states is emambnanb .
In summary, in MDI-QKD, if the source is assumed to be
trusted, we have:
Y µµnanb = Y
νν
nanb
eµµnanb = e
νν
nanb
.
If the source is accessible to Eve (i.e., the source is untrusted),
we have:
Y µµmambnanb = Y
νν
mambnanb
eµµmambnanb = e
νν
mambnanb
.
The dependence of Ynanb and enanb on different states is a
fundamental difference between MDI-QKD with an untrusted
source and MDI-QKD with trusted source. Therefore, in
MDI-QKD with an untrusted source, Eve is given signifi-
cantly greater power, and the decoy state analysis is much
more challenging. However, rather surprisingly, it is still pos-
sible to achieve the unconditional security quantitatively even
if the source is given to Eve. This is mainly because we are
only focusing on the untagged pulses, whose photon number
distribution, the gain and the QBER can be bounded via Eqs.
(B4), (B1), (B2) respectively. Therefore we are still able to
estimate QZ11 and eX11. Such estimation can be completed by
using either numerical method based on linear programming
or analytical method.
In a MDI-QKD implementation with an untrusted source,
by performing the measurements for different intensity set-
tings, we can obtain:
Qχγaγb =
ma=(1+δa)Ma∑
ma=(1−δa)Ma
mb=(1+δb)Mb∑
mb=(1−δb)Mb
∞∑
na=0
∞∑
nb=0
Pin(ma)Pin(mb)P
γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb)Ymambnanb
EχγaγbQ
χ
γaγb
=
ma=(1+δa)Ma∑
ma=(1−δa)Ma
mb=(1+δb)Mb∑
mb=(1−δb)Mb
∞∑
na=0
∞∑
nb=0
Pin(ma)Pin(mb)P
γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb)Ymambnanbemambnanb
(C1)
where χ ∈ {X,Z} denotes the basis choice, γa (γb) denotes
Alice’s (Bob’s) intensity setting, Qχγaγb (E
χ
γaγb
) denotes the
gain (QBER); where Pin(ma) is the probability that the input
signal contains ma photons (i.e., the ratio of the number of
signals withm input photons over k), P γa(na|ma) is the con-
ditional probability that the output signal contains na photons
given the input signal contains ma photons, for state γa and is
given by Eq. (B3).
QZ11 for γa = µ and γb = µ can be written as
9QZ11 =
ma=(1+δa)Ma∑
ma=(1−δa)Ma
mb=(1+δb)Mb∑
mb=(1−δb)Mb
Pin(ma)Pin(mb)P
µ(1|ma)Pµ(1|mb)Ymamb11
≥ Pµ1|maP
µ
1|mb
ma=(1+δa)Ma∑
ma=(1−δa)Ma
mb=(1+δb)Mb∑
mb=(1−δb)Mb
Pin(ma)Pin(mb)Ymamb11 ≡ Pµ1|maP
µ
1|mbS
Z
11,
(C2)
where the bounds of the probabilities are from Eqs. (B4).
Thus, the estimation on QZ11 is equivalent to the estimation
of SZ11, and Eq. (C1) can be written as
Qχγaγb =
∞∑
na,nb=0
P γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb)Sχnanb
EχγaγbQ
χ
γaγb
=
∞∑
na,nb=0
P γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb)Sχnanbeχnanb
(C3)
1. Numerical approaches
Ignoring statistical fluctuations temporally, the estimations
on SZ11 and eX11, from Eq. (C3) are constrained optimisation
problems, which is linear and can be efficiently solved by lin-
ear programming (LP). The numerical routine to solve these
problems can be written as:
min :SZ11,
s.t. :0 ≤ SZnanb ≤ 1, with na, nb ∈ Scut;
P (na|ma) =

(1− λa)(1−δa)Ma , if na = 0;(
(1+δa)Ma
na
)
λna(1− λa)(1+δa)Ma−na , if 1 ≤ n ≤ (1 + δa)Ma;
0, if na > (1 + δa)Ma;
P (na|ma) =

(1− λa)(1+δa)Ma , if na = 0;(
(1−δa)Ma
na
)
λna(1− λa)(1−δa)Ma−na , if 1 ≤ n ≤ (1− δa)Ma;
0, if na > (1− δa)Ma;
QZγaγb − 1 +
∑
na,nb∈Scut
P γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb) ≤
∑
n,m∈Scut
P γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb)SZnanb ≤ QZγaγb
Max :eX11,
s.t. :0 ≤ SXnanb ≤ 1, 0 ≤ SXnanbeXnanb ≤ 1, with na, nb ∈ Scut
P (na|ma) =

(1− λaq)(1−δa)Ma , if na = 0;(
(1+δa)Ma
na
)
(λaq)
na(1− λaq)(1+δa)Ma−na , if 1 ≤ n ≤ (1 + δa)Ma;
0, if na > (1 + δa)Ma;
P (na|ma) =

(1− λaq)(1+δa)Ma , if na = 0;(
(1−δa)Ma
na
)
(λaq)
na(1− λaq)(1−δa)Ma−na , if 1 ≤ n ≤ (1− δa)Ma;
0, if na > (1− δa)Ma;
QXγaγb − 1 +
∑
na,nb∈Scut
P γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb) ≤
∑
n,m∈Scut
P γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb)SXnanb ≤ QXγaγb
QXγaγbE
X
γaγb
− 1 +
∑
na,nb∈Scut
P γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb) ≤
∑
n,m∈Scut
P γa(na|ma)P γb(nb|mb)SXnanbeXnanb ≤ QXγaγbEXγaγb ,
where Scut denotes a finite set of indexes na and nb, with
Scut = {na, nb ∈ N with na ≤ Acut and nb ≤ Bcut}, for
prefixed values of Acut ≥ 2 and NBcut ≥ 2. In our simu-
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lations, we choose Acut = 7 and Bcut = 7, as larger Acut
and Bcut have negligible effect on decoy-state estimation.
More discussions can be seen in [22]. Here, γ ∈ {µ, ν, ω}
for two decoy-state estimation. Notice that statistical fluctu-
ations can be easily conducted by adding constraints on the
experimental measurements of Qχγaγb and E
χ
γaγb
. These addi-
tional constraints can be analyzed by using statistical estima-
tion methods, such as standard error analysis [22] or Chernoff
bound [26]. A rigorous finite-key analysis can also be imple-
mented by following the technique presented in [26].
2. Analytical approaches
A rigorous estimation is to solve the equation set of
Eq. (C3) by using the constrains on the binomial probability
distributions given by Eq. (B4). The analytical expression for
such an estimation is highly complicated. So, we only use nu-
merical method presented in last section to study this precise
estimation. Here, for the analytical expression, we present a
relatively simple analytical method by using the Poisson limit
theorem [58]:
Claim: Under the condition that m → ∞ and λq → 0,
such that µ = mλq, then(
m
n
)
(λq)n(1− λq)m−n → exp(−µ)µ
n
n!
(C4)
The condition in this claim is easy to meet in an actual
experiment as m can be larger than 106 and λq is normally
lower that 10−7 in a practical setup. The intuition behind this
approximation is that we applied heavy attenuation on the in-
put pulses in Alice and bob. The input pulse has more than
∼ 106 photons, while the output pulse has less than one pho-
ton on average. The internal attenuation of Alice’s local lab
is greater than -60dB. We know that heavy attenuation will
transform arbitrary photon number distribution into a Poisson-
like distribution. A qualitative argument on this argument for
the plug-and-play structure has been provided in [9]. From
the approximation, Eq. (C3) can be estimated using the simi-
lar methods presented in [28].
The lower bound of SZ11 is given by
SZ11 =
1
(µ− ω)2(ν − ω)2(µ− ν) × [(µ
2 − ω2)(µ− ω)(QZννe2ν +QZωωe2ω −QZνωeν+ω −QZωνeω+ν)−
(ν2 − ω2)(ν − ω)(QZµµe2µ +QZωωe2ω −QZµωeµ+ω −QZωµeω+µ)].
The upper bound of SX11e
X
11 is given by
SX11e
X
11 =
1
(ν − ω)2 × [e
2νQXννE
X
νν + e
2ωQXωωE
X
ωω − eν+ωQXνωEXνω − eω+νQXωνEXων ].
Appendix D: Simulation techniques
In simulation, the gain and the QBER are derived using
the channel model presented in [25]. We consider two decoy
states: ν = 0.01 and ω = 0, and we optimize the signal state
µ for different distances. We choose fe = 1.16
1. Imperfect intensity detector
There are two major imperfections of the intensity detec-
tor (ID): inefficiency and noise. The inefficiency ηID can
be easily modeled as additional loss by using a beam split-
ter. The noise of the ID is another important imperfection.
In a real experiment, the ID may indicate a certain pulse
contains m′ photons. Here we refer to m′ as the measured
photon number in contrast to the actual photon number m.
However, due to the noise and the inaccuracy of the inten-
sity monitor, this pulse may not contain exactly m′ pho-
tons. To quantify this imperfection, following [48], we in-
troduce a term, called conservative interval ς . We then de-
fine V s as the number of sampling pulses with measured pho-
ton number m′ ∈ [(1 − δ)M ′ + ς, (1 + δ)M ′ − ς], where
M ′ = MηID(1− q). One can conclude that, with confidence
level τc = 1 − c(ς), the number of untagged sampling pulses
V s ≥ V s. One can make c(ς) arbitrarily close to 0 by choos-
ing a large enough ς . That is, for one individual pulse, the
probability that |m−m′| > ς can be negligible.
In practice, various noise sources, including thermal noise,
shot-noise, etc, may exist. Here, in simulation, we consider
a simple noise model where a constant Gaussian noise with
variance σ2ID is assumed. That is, if m photons enter an effi-
cient but noisy ID, the probability that the measured photon
11
number is m′ obeys a Gaussian distribution
P (m′|m) = 1
σIM
√
2pi
exp[− (m−m
′)2
2σ2ID
]. (D1)
Hence, the measured photon number distribution P (m′) has
a larger variation than the actual photon number distribution
P (m) due to the noise. More concretely, if the input pho-
ton numbers obeys a Gaussian distribution centered atM with
variance σ2, the measured photon numbers also obeys a Gaus-
sian distribution centered atM ′, but with a variance σ2+σ2ID.
2. The tagged ratio ∆
For any δ ∈ [0, 1] and the imperfect ID discussed above, we
can calculate ∆ from the measured photon number m′ by
∆ = 1− [Φ(M ′ + δM ′ + ς)− Φ(M ′ − δM ′ − ς))], (D2)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the photon
number for the measured pulses [58]. Assuming that the sys-
tem is based on a coherent source by Charlie, which means
that the input photon number m obeys Poisson distribution. It
is natural to set M to be the average input photon number. In
numerical simulation, for ease of calculation, we approximate
the Poisson distribution of the input photon number M as a
Gaussian distribution centered at M with variance σ2 = M .
This is an excellent approximation because M is very large
(107 or larger) in all the simulations presented below. Then,
the measured photon number m′ follows a Gaussian distribu-
tion centered atM ′ = MηID(1−q) with a varianceM+σ2ID.
The Gaussian cumulative distribution function is given by [58]
Φg(x) =
1
2
[1 + erf(
x−M ′√
2(M + σ2ID)
)], (D3)
where erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function. Notice
that erf(x) is an odd function, from Eqs. (D2) and (D3), we
have
∆ = 1− erf( δM
′ + ς√
2M + 2σ2ID
). (D4)
In simulation, for δ = δa = δb, a choice for it that is too
large or too small will make the security analysis less opti-
mal [48]. We find numerically that δ = 0.01 is a near an
optimal value.
3. Finite-data statistics
A real-life QKD experiment is always completed in finite
time, which means that the length of the output secret key is
obviously finite. Thus, the parameter estimation procedure in
QKD needs to take the statistical fluctuations of the differ-
ent parameters into account. We assume that Charlie’s source
generates 2k pulses in an experiment. The finite data effect
has two main consequences: First, the finite data size will in-
troduce statistical fluctuations for the estimation of the num-
ber of untagged pulses. If the confidence level τa for Propo-
sition 1 is expected to be close to 1, a has to be positive.
More concretely, for a fixed 2k, if the estimate on the un-
trusted source is expected to have confidence level no less
than τa, one has to choose a as a =
√
− ln(1−τa)k . In
simulation, we choose the confidence level τ (see Proposi-
tion 1) as τa = τb = τ ≥ 1 − 10−7, which suggests that
a = b = 3.03 × 10−7. Since a and b are non-zero in
this finite data case, the estimate of the gain of the untagged
pulses becomes not tight at long distances. That is, due to
statistical fluctuations, the proportion of tagged pulses is in-
creased at long distance. Our analysis is conservative in that
Eve can fully control the tagged pulses, which makes the secu-
rity bounds worse than MDI-QKD with trusted sources. This
is the reason why MDI-QKD with an untrusted source is not
as good as MDI-QKD with trusted sources in the finite-data
case, which has been shown in the Fig. 4 of main text.
Second, in decoy state MDI-QKD, the statistical fluctua-
tions of experimental outputs have to be considered. The tech-
nique to analyze the statistical fluctuations can be analyzed
by using statistical estimation methods, such as standard er-
ror analysis [22] or Chernoff bound [26]. In this paper, we
analyze the statistical fluctuations by using the standard error
analysis method presented in [22]. In simulation, we choose
 = 10−10 as the overall security bound.
∗ Electronic address: fhxu@mit.edu
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum
cryptography,” Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 74, no. 1,
p. 145, 2002.
[2] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusˇek,
N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, “The security of practical quan-
tum key distribution,” Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 81,
no. 3, p. 1301, 2009.
[3] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, “Secure quantum key dis-
tribution,” Nature Photonics, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 595–604, 2014.
[4] http://www.idquantique.com.
[5] QuantumCTek: http://www.quantum-info.com/en.php; QaSky:
http://www.qasky.com/EN/Default.aspx; QuintessenceLabs Pty.
Ltd: http://www.quintessencelabs.com.
[6] M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus, K. Wakui,
M. Takeoka, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang, A. Tanaka, et al.,
“Field test of quantum key distribution in the tokyo qkd net-
work,” Optics Express, vol. 19, no. 11, pp. 10387–10409, 2011.
[7] B. Fro¨hlich, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, A. W. Sharpe,
Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “A quantum access network,” Na-
ture, vol. 501, no. 7465, pp. 69–72, 2013.
[8] R. J. Hughes, J. E. Nordholt, K. P. McCabe, R. T. Newell, C. G.
Peterson, and R. D. Somma, “Network-centric quantum com-
munications with application to critical infrastructure protec-
tion,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1305.0305, 2013.
[9] N. Gisin, S. Fasel, B. Kraus, H. Zbinden, and G. Ribordy,
12
“Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems,”
Physical Review A, vol. 73, no. 022320, 2006.
[10] F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Experimental demonstration of
phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution
system,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 12, p. 113026, 2010.
[11] S. Sun, M. Jiang, and L. Liang, “Passive faraday-mirror attack
in a practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system,” Phys-
ical Review A, vol. 83, p. 062331, 2011.
[12] Y. Zhao, C. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo, “Quan-
tum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack
against practical quantum-key-distribution systems,” Physical
Review A, vol. 78, p. 042333, 2008.
[13] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and
V. Makarov, “Hacking quantum cryptography systems by tai-
lored bright illumination,” Nature Photonics, vol. 4, no. 10,
pp. 686–689, 2010.
[14] I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer,
and V. Makarov, “Perfect eavesdropping on a quantum cryptog-
raphy system,” Nature Communications, vol. 2, p. 349, 2011.
[15] H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fuerst, S. Nauerth, and H. We-
infurter, “Quantum eavesdropping without interception: An at-
tack exploiting the dead time of single photon detectors,” New
Journal of Physics, vol. 13, p. 073024, 2011.
[16] N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser,
C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Device calibration
impacts security of quantum key distribution,” Physical Review
Letters, vol. 107, no. 11, p. 110501, 2011.
[17] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, “Measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution,” Physical Review Let-
ters, vol. 108, no. 13, p. 130503, 2012.
[18] Z. Yuan, J. Dynes, and A. Shields, “Resilience of gated
avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in
quantum cryptography,” Applied Physics Letters, vol. 98,
no. 23, pp. 231104–231104, 2011.
[19] T. Ferreira da Silva, G. B. Xavier, G. P. Tempora˜o, and J. P.
von der Weid, “Real-time monitoring of single-photon detectors
against eavesdropping in quantum key distribution systems,”
Optics Express, vol. 20, no. 17, pp. 18911–18924, 2012.
[20] C. Lim, N. Walenta, M. Legre, N. Gisin, and H. Zbinden, “Ran-
dom variation of detector efficiency: A countermeasure against
detector blinding attacks for quantum key distribution,” IEEE
Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, vol. 21,
no. 3, p. 6601305, 2015.
[21] A. Acı´n, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, S. Pironio, and
V. Scarani, “Device-independent security of quantum cryp-
tography against collective attacks,” Physical Review Letters,
vol. 98, no. 23, p. 230501, 2007.
[22] X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, and M. Razavi, “Statistical fluctu-
ation analysis for measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution,” Physical Review A, vol. 86, no. 5, p. 052305,
2012.
[23] X. Ma and M. Razavi, “Alternative schemes for measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution,” Physical Review
A, vol. 86, no. 6, p. 062319, 2012.
[24] X.-B. Wang, “Three-intensity decoy-state method for device-
independent quantum key distribution with basis-dependent er-
rors,” Physical Review A, vol. 87, no. 1, p. 012320, 2013.
[25] F. Xu, M. Curty, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Practical aspects
of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution,”
New Journal of Physics, vol. 15, no. 11, p. 113007, 2013.
[26] M. Curty, F. Xu, W. Cui, C. C. W. Lim, K. Tamaki, and H.-K.
Lo, “Finite-key analysis for measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution,” Nature Communications, vol. 5,
p. 3732, 2014.
[27] F. Xu, B. Qi, Z. Liao, and H.-K. Lo, “Long distance
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
with entangled photon sources,” Applied Physics Letters,
vol. 103, no. 6, p. 061101, 2013.
[28] F. Xu, H. Xu, and H.-K. Lo, “Protocol choice and parameter
optimization in decoy-state measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution,” Physical Review A, vol. 89, no. 5,
p. 052333, 2014.
[29] Y. Fu, H.-L. Yin, T.-Y. Chen, and Z.-B. Chen, “Long-distance
measurement-device-independent multiparty quantum commu-
nication,” Physics Review Letters, vol. 114, p. 090501, Mar
2015.
[30] A. Rubenok, J. A. Slater, P. Chan, I. Lucio-Martinez, and
W. Tittel, “Real-world two-photon interference and proof-of-
principle quantum key distribution immune to detector attacks,”
Physical Review Letters, vol. 111, p. 130501, Sep 2013.
[31] Y. Liu, T.-Y. Chen, L.-J. Wang, H. Liang, G.-L. Shentu,
J. Wang, K. Cui, H.-L. Yin, N.-L. Liu, L. Li, X. Ma, J. S.
Pelc, M. M. Fejer, C.-Z. Peng, Q. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan, “Ex-
perimental measurement-device-independent quantum key dis-
tribution,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 111, p. 130502, Sep
2013.
[32] T. Ferreira da Silva, D. Vitoreti, G. B. Xavier, G. C. do Ama-
ral, G. P. Tempora˜o, and J. P. von der Weid, “Proof-of-principle
demonstration of measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution using polarization qubits,” Physical Review A,
vol. 88, p. 052303, Nov 2013.
[33] Z. Tang, Z. Liao, F. Xu, B. Qi, L. Qian, and H.-K. Lo, “Exper-
imental demonstration of polarization-encoding measurement
device independent quantum key distribution,” Physics Review
Letters, vol. 112, p. 190503, 2014.
[34] Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, S.-J. Chen, Y. Liu, W.-J. Zhang,
X. Jiang, L. Zhang, J. Wang, L.-X. You, J.-Y. Guan, et al.,
“Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
over 200 km,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 113, no. 19,
p. 190501, 2014.
[35] R. Valivarthi, I. Lucio-Martinez, P. Chan, A. Rubenok, C. John,
D. Korchinski, C. Duffin, F. Marsili, V. Verma, M. D. Shaw,
et al., “Measurement-device-independent quantum key dis-
tribution: from idea towards application,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1501.07307, 2015.
[36] F. Xu, M. Curty, B. Qi, and H. Lo, “Measurement-device-
independent quantum cryptography,” IEEE Journal of Selected
Topics in Quantum Electronics, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 6601111,
2015.
[37] H.-J. Briegel, W. Du¨r, J. I. Cirac, and P. Zoller, “Quantum re-
peaters: The role of imperfect local operations in quantum com-
munication,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 81, no. 26, p. 5932,
1998.
[38] J. M. Arrazola and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, “Quantum fingerprinting
with coherent states and a constant mean number of photons,”
Physical Review A, vol. 89, no. 6, p. 062305, 2014.
[39] F. Xu, J. M. Arrazola, et al., “Experimental quantum finger-
printing,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1503.05499, 2015.
[40] V. Dunjko, E. Kashefi, and A. Leverrier, “Blind quantum com-
puting with weak coherent pulses,” Physical Review Letters,
vol. 108, no. 20, p. 200502, 2012.
[41] P. Gonzalez, L. Rebon, T. F. da Silva, M. Figueroa, C. Saave-
dra, M. Curty, G. Lima, G. Xavier, and W. Nogueira, “Quan-
tum key distribution with untrusted detectors,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1410.1422, 2014.
[42] C. C. W. Lim, B. Korzh, A. Martin, F. Bussieres, R. Thew, and
H. Zbinden, “Detector-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution,” Applied Physics Letters, vol. 105, no. 22, p. 221112,
13
2014.
[43] W.-F. Cao, Y.-Z. Zhen, Y.-L. Zheng, Z.-B. Chen, N.-L.
Liu, K. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, “Highly efficient quantum key
distribution immune to all detector attacks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1410.2928, 2014.
[44] W.-Y. Liang, M. Li, Z.-Q. Yin, W. Chen, S. Wang, X.-B. An,
G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, “A simple implementation of quan-
tum key distribution based on single-photon bell state measure-
ment,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1505.00897, 2015.
[45] B. Qi, “Trustworthiness of detectors in quantum key distribu-
tion with untrusted detectors,” Physical Review A, vol. 91, no. 2,
p. 020303, 2015.
[46] Y.-S. Kim, Y. Choi, O. Kwon, S.-W. Han, and S. Moon, “Plug-
and-play measurement-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1501.03344, 2015.
[47] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Quantum key distribution with
an unknown and untrusted source,” Physical Review A, vol. 77,
no. 5, p. 052327, 2008.
[48] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo, and L. Qian, “Security analysis of
an untrusted source for quantum key distribution: passive ap-
proach,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 023024,
2010.
[49] T. Chapuran, P. Toliver, N. Peters, J. Jackel, M. Goodman,
R. Runser, S. McNown, N. Dallmann, R. Hughes, K. McCabe,
et al., “Optical networking for quantum key distribution and
quantum communications,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 11,
no. 10, p. 105001, 2009.
[50] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, “Experimental quantum key
distribution with active phase randomization,” Applied Physics
Letters, vol. 90, no. 4, p. 044106, 2007.
[51] X. Peng, H. Jiang, B. Xu, X. Ma, and H. Guo, “Experimen-
tal quantum-key distribution with an untrusted source,” Optics
Letters, vol. 33, no. 18, pp. 2077–2079, 2008.
[52] S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J.-P. Bourgoin, A. Pappa,
L. Monat, M. Legre´, and V. Makarov, “Attacks exploiting de-
viation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution
and coin tossing,” Physical Review A, vol. 91, no. 3, p. 032326,
2015.
[53] Z. Zhang, M. Tengner, T. Zhong, F. N. Wong, and J. H.
Shapiro, “Entanglements benefit survives an entanglement-
breaking channel,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 111, no. 1,
p. 010501, 2013.
[54] F. Xu, S. Sajeed, S. Kaiser, Z. Tang, L. Qian, V. Makarov,
and H.-K. Lo, “Experimental quantum key distribution with
source flaws and tight finite-key analysis,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1408.3667, 2014.
[55] W. Hwang, “Quantum key distribution with high loss: To-
ward global secure communication,” Physical Review Letters,
vol. 91, p. 57901, 2003.
[56] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, “Decoy state quantum key dis-
tribution,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 94, p. 230504, 2005.
[57] X. Wang, “Beating the photon-number-splitting attack in prac-
tical quantum cryptography,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 94,
p. 230503, 2005.
[58] A. Papoulis and S. U. Pillai, Probability, random variables, and
stochastic processes. Tata McGraw-Hill Education, 2002.
[59] W. Hoeffding, “Probability inequalities for sums of bounded
random variables,” Journal of the American statistical associa-
tion, vol. 58, no. 301, pp. 13–30, 1963.
[60] F. Marsili, V. Verma, J. Stern, S. Harrington, A. Lita, T. Ger-
rits, I. Vayshenker, B. Baek, M. Shaw, R. Mirin, et al., “Detect-
ing single infrared photons with 93% system efficiency,” Nature
Photonics, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 210–214, 2013.
[61] M. Lucamarini, I. Choi, M. B. Ward, J. F. Dynes, Z. Yuan,
and A. J. Shields, “Practical security bounds against the trojan-
horse attack in quantum key distribution,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1506.01989, 2015.
